{"id":4682,"date":"2021-05-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2021-05-25T21:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dzo.kei.mybluehost.me\/evaluation\/full-report-of-the-evaluation-of-the-wfp-emergency-operations-emops-10048-00-01-02-in-the-sudan-food-assistance-to-populations-affecred-by-war-and-drought\/"},"modified":"2021-07-06T23:01:32","modified_gmt":"2021-07-06T20:01:32","slug":"full-report-of-the-evaluation-of-the-wfp-emergency-operations-emops-10048-00-01-02-in-the-sudan-food-assistance-to-populations-affecred-by-war-and-drought","status":"publish","type":"evaluation","link":"https:\/\/csf-sudan.org\/ar\/evaluation\/full-report-of-the-evaluation-of-the-wfp-emergency-operations-emops-10048-00-01-02-in-the-sudan-food-assistance-to-populations-affecred-by-war-and-drought\/","title":{"rendered":"Full Report of the Evaluation of the WFP Emergency Operations (EMOPs) 10048.00\/01\/02 in the Sudan: Food Assistance to populations affecred by war and drought"},"content":{"rendered":"

Executive Summary<\/strong> <\/span><\/p>\n

The operation is characterised by its long durati<\/span>on and scale. It was amongst WFP\u2019s top five <\/span>emergency operations in 2003. It is also one of<\/span> WFP\u2019s most complex <\/span>operations due to the <\/span>combination of war and drought\/chronic food insecu<\/span>rity, the frequent emergence of new crises <\/span>and the necessity of developing <\/span>a sophisticated air ope<\/span>ration. The unique characteristics of and <\/span>serious constraints faced by the operation<\/span> must be acknowledged when assessing <\/span>accomplishments and weaknesses, in particular<\/span> the impact on staff time of securing and <\/span>maintaining humanitarian access. <\/span><\/p>\n

WFP\u2019s emergency operation has been central to<\/span> humanitarian efforts in Sudan and WFP has <\/span>saved lives. This is widely recognised <\/span>by donors, other humanitarian agencies and <\/span>beneficiaries. WFP staff and im<\/span>plementing partners have distri<\/span>buted food in difficult and often <\/span>hazardous living and working conditions, over sustai<\/span>ned periods of time. <\/span><\/p>\n

Unfortunately, it is <\/span>not possible to quantify how many <\/span>lives have been saved, and, as <\/span>is recognized by field staff, it <\/span>would be difficult in any event to<\/span> attribute lives saved to food ai<\/span>d alone. It wi<\/span>ll always be <\/span>difficult to measure results at this level,<\/span> although WFP would be <\/span>in a better position to <\/span>demonstrate results if the successes highlight<\/span>ed by staff and partners had been better <\/span>documented. <\/span><\/p>\n

Under the current (third) phase of EMOP 10048, <\/span>the prime objective of contributing to saving <\/span>lives is to be effected by \u2018improving and\/or ma<\/span>intaining the nutritional st<\/span>atus of target persons <\/span>with specific emphasis on women.\u2019 The specific ta<\/span>rgets set are the reduc<\/span>tion of malnutrition <\/span>rates to below the (2002) national average of 18 <\/span>percent Global Acute Ma<\/span>lnutrition (GAM), or <\/span>maintenance below the present rate where it <\/span>is less than 18 perc<\/span>ent. <\/span><\/p>\n

The 2003\/2004 Annual <\/span>Needs Assessment reported an overall GAM rate <\/span>of 21 percent for both sectors, which is higher <\/span>than the target and well above the \u2018critical th<\/span>reshold\u2019 of 15 percent. The reality is that <\/span>unacceptably high malnutrition rates have pers<\/span>isted for many years in Sudan and unless a <\/span>concerted effort is made by WFP and opera<\/span>tional partners to develop a holistic and <\/span>comprehensive approach to tackling malnutritio<\/span>n, there is little reason to believe that the <\/span>situation will improve. <\/span><\/p>\n

The second indicator specified in the current pha<\/span>se of the EMOP relates to outputs \u2013 timeliness <\/span>of food distributions in accordance with EMOP <\/span>plans. There was considerable under-delivery <\/span>against what was planned over the three calendar years 2001-2003. In terms of commodities, <\/span>66% of what was planned for distribution was <\/span>actually delivered (or air dropped) for final <\/span>distribution. Under-delivery was most pronounced<\/span> in the northern sect<\/span>or, and most pronounced <\/span>for both sectors in 2003, when the targets were<\/span> higher, however. This was compounded by an <\/span>incomplete food basket – pulses,<\/span> oil, salt and\/or CSB were <\/span>often missing. Although every effort <\/span>was made to carry out distributions during <\/span>the \u2018hunger season\u2019, food <\/span>supplies were often <\/span>available later than planned. <\/span><\/p>\n

There have been annual increases in commodity <\/span>requirements. Overall, the EMOP has been <\/span>resourced to an average of only 70.4 percent <\/span>in dollar terms over the three phases and the <\/span>percentage of requirements met by donors has r<\/span>ecently declined. The timing of commitments <\/span>has been a problem, with the bulk of funds only <\/span>registered during the second and third quarters <\/span>resulting in shipments reaching Port Sudan or <\/span>Mombasa during the second part of the year. <\/span><\/p>\n

It <\/span>has been possible to mitigate these difficulties by <\/span>utilising carry-over stocks (in the first phase <\/span>of the EMOP) and making extensive borrowings. <\/span>The additional factor at play ha<\/span>s been pipeline flow. The relativ<\/span>ely large stocks on hand in the <\/span>northern sector in December 2002, and again in December 2003 through February 2004, <\/span>indicate some congestion over and above what <\/span>can be explained by a normal build-up at this <\/span>time of the year. <\/span><\/p>\n

The major constraints are limit<\/span>ed road and air capacity from the major WFP <\/span>hubs and restricted access. <\/span>As mentioned above, 66 percent of what was <\/span>planned for distribution <\/span>in the period 2001-2003 <\/span>was actually delivered for final <\/span>distribution. What is not clea<\/span>r is the exact proportion of <\/span>commodities that has reached in<\/span>tended beneficiaries. <\/span><\/p>\n

Although targeting has been a major <\/span>preoccupation of the operation and numerous exer<\/span>cises have been undertaken to improve it, <\/span>redistribution in the form of sharing on the basi<\/span>s of kinship is widespread. Although it may be <\/span>hoped that redistribution favours the most vulnerabl<\/span>e, or at least does not discriminate against <\/span>them, we do not know enough to be confident. <\/span>In addition to redistribution, there has been so<\/span>me diversion of commodities, further reducing <\/span>the quantities available to intended beneficiar<\/span>ies. Taxation has occurred (and may still be <\/span>occurring) in the southern sect<\/span>or where it has been organise<\/span>d by local aut<\/span>horities through <\/span>traditional structures. <\/span><\/p>\n

Non-civilians have also <\/span>had access to WFP relief supplies in the southern <\/span>sector, putting WFP staff and in<\/span>tended beneficiaries at risk. <\/span>Distance decay (the relationship between distan<\/span>ce and the breakdown in the effectiveness of <\/span>targeting) is also a significant factor, particularly<\/span> in the southern sector where it has been most <\/span>difficult to establish distribution points close to <\/span>beneficiaries. It should also be noted that <\/span>planned ration sizes and duration have generally b<\/span>een modest and finely tuned. <\/span><\/p>\n

This is positive <\/span>because it maximizes the use of scarce resources, but it leaves little room for error in the event <\/span>of undersupply, late distribut<\/span>ion, redistribution, etc. <\/span>Given the reductions that had to be made to <\/span>the commodities distributed due to under-delivery, <\/span>timing problems, and the various effects of redi<\/span>stribution, diversion, <\/span>taxation and distance <\/span>decay, senior managers need to consider th<\/span>e possibility that the <\/span>hungry poor WFP seeks to <\/span>assist in Sudan sometimes do not<\/span> receive enough food to make a <\/span>real difference nutritionally, <\/span>and work through the implications. <\/span><\/p>\n

More gene<\/span>rally, the evaluation team believes that <\/span>improving the effectiveness of final distribution ha<\/span>s to be accorded a hi<\/span>gher corporate priority <\/span>by WFP – it goes directly to WFP\u2019s core mandate. <\/span>In order to be able to guide programming in <\/span>Sudan and assess the progress and impact of its <\/span>food relief operations, WFP needs to be more <\/span>involved in the collec<\/span>tion and analysis of <\/span>nutrition data and information, including the analys<\/span>is of the causality of<\/span> malnutrition in areas <\/span>with chronic food insecurity th<\/span>at appear unresponsive to ong<\/span>oing food relief. WFP has a global <\/span><\/p>\n

MoU with UNICEF through which UNICEF is expected<\/span> to take the lead, but its terms related <\/span>to nutrition are not being implem<\/span>ented by UNICEF for a variety of reasons principally related <\/span>to capacity. <\/span><\/p>\n

WFP has a strong logistics operati<\/span>on, particularly in air trans<\/span>port, with national reach and <\/span>extensive coverage, putting WFP in a league of<\/span> its own in relation to other agencies and <\/span>organisations. <\/span><\/p>\n

WFP logistics ha<\/span>ve long provided the backbone <\/span>to Operation Lifeline Sudan. <\/span>WFP recognises the need to substantially impr<\/span>ove overland transport to move commodities, <\/span>and substantial funds have finally <\/span>been received to do so. But it wi<\/span>ll be only possible to switch <\/span>from airlift \/ airdrop operations to road deli<\/span>veries once the road repair and rehabilitation <\/span>operations are well under way and peace becomes a reality. <\/span>The funds requested for the rehabi<\/span>litation of the road system and <\/span>runways in the southern sector <\/span>by way of a budget revision are significant (US<\/span>$26.7 million) and the responsibility to be <\/span>shouldered by WFP is considerable<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is recommended that HQ a<\/span>ssist the Logistics Unit in the <\/span>southern sector conduct a risk management exerci<\/span>se in relation to the <\/span>successful completion of <\/span>these works. <\/span>As is well known, the costs of conducting emerge<\/span>ncy operations in Sudan are high – the final <\/span>cost per ton under EMOP 10048.2 Budget Re<\/span>vision 3 has risen to around US$1,000 due <\/span>principally to the inclusion of the aforementi<\/span>oned works. But under the circumstances, with a <\/span>transport system stretched to the limit and persistent insecurity in some areas, WFP has little <\/span>leverage to contain costs. <\/span>Together with the Crop and Food Supply Asse<\/span>ssment Missions, the Annual Needs Assessment <\/span>(ANA) exercise has been the most regular and <\/span>extensive source of info<\/span>rmation on food security <\/span>covering Sudan. But despite th<\/span>e time and energy put into c<\/span>onducting and strengthening the <\/span>ANA by WFP, and wide part<\/span>icipation, donors are not necessarily convinced by ANA <\/span>recommendations. This was <\/span>most notable in 2003. <\/span><\/p>\n

The inclusion of recovery\/peace related objectives<\/span> in the EMOP, with modest targets for Food-<\/span>For-Work, Food-For-Training and Emergency Sc<\/span>hool Feeding Programmes (7 percent of <\/span>commodities in the third phase), was appropriate, although the EMOP documents did not <\/span>adequately connect planned activities to th<\/span>e achievement of the recovery\/peace related <\/span>objectives. This reflects inadequate corporat<\/span>e guidance about how to <\/span>realize \u2018recovery\u2019 and <\/span>\u2018transition\u2019 objectives. <\/span>Food-for-Work and Food-for-Traini<\/span>ng activities have been difficu<\/span>lt to get in motion and there <\/span>have similarly been constraints on scaling <\/span>up Emergency School Feeding Programmes. While <\/span>concrete outputs have been achieved, targets ha<\/span>ve not quite been met. There has been no <\/span>assessment of recovery outcomes for these <\/span>activities, making it difficult to evaluate <\/span>effectiveness. The setting of global targets, wh<\/span>ile necessary as a guide, has tended to ignore the <\/span>local situation, resulting in some areas moving ah<\/span>ead with these <\/span>activities when staff capacity, <\/span>local IP capacity, and\/or techni<\/span>cal expertise are inadequate. <\/span>Expectations among the donor and humanitarian co<\/span>mmunities of making th<\/span>e transition to more <\/span>developmental activities have rise<\/span>n steadily in recent years. This has been positive but to some <\/span>extent transition has become an imperative to move<\/span> out of relief rather than<\/span> a fair assessment of <\/span>relief needs moving forward and the challenges<\/span> of effectively utilisi<\/span>ng food assistance to <\/span>support recovery and rehabilitatio<\/span>n (the difficulties re<\/span>late to geographic coverage, targeting, <\/span>timing and capacity). <\/span><\/p>\n

Without dampening enthusiasm<\/span> for a shift from relief to recovery, senior <\/span>WFP managers need to provide more gui<\/span>dance and counsel caution and realism. <\/span>It also needs to be recognised that peace not on<\/span>ly offers opportunities for recovery \u2013 it offers <\/span>opportunities to improve the effectiveness of f<\/span>ood relief (better coverage, better targeting, <\/span>improved timing, more attention to micronutrients<\/span>, etc) and thereby make a more effective <\/span>contribution to finally reducing persistently high malnutrition rates. <\/span>WFP has been a leader and an advocate for wo<\/span>men within the Sudan emergency operation, a <\/span>role clearly recognized by its <\/span>partners, and has made progres<\/span>s towards institutionalizing <\/span>Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW). <\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>responsible staff memb<\/span>ers in both Khartoum <\/span>and Lokichoggio agree that management must <\/span>now shift the focus toward mainstreaming and <\/span>better monitoring the implementation of the ECW. <\/span>Overall, monitoring at both the output and outcome levels remains an institutional weakness, a <\/span>reflection of practical difficulties and the lowe<\/span>r priority accorded to performance information. <\/span>Commodity tracking remains problematic. A major problem is that the Logistics and <\/span>Programme Units monitor commodity throughput <\/span>in a different way. A means has to be found <\/span>of reconciling this information and presenting <\/span>a readily intelligible overview to senior <\/span>managers. <\/span>The management structure for the EMOP, whic<\/span>h is divided between two country offices, <\/span>involves some logistical and progr<\/span>amming inefficiency, and to this<\/span> extent hinders the effective <\/span>implementation of the operation. <\/span><\/p>\n

However, WFP <\/span>has no choice but to op<\/span>erate two systems in <\/span>tandem and it is unlikely that a peace agreement <\/span>would change this. It <\/span>would be appropriate <\/span>nonetheless for the CO Khartoum and CO Nairobi <\/span>to jointly review the <\/span>management structure <\/span>of WFP\u2019s operations in the Sudan (led<\/span> by the ODK Regional <\/span>Director or HQ). <\/span>The evaluation team agrees that<\/span> the EMOP should be converted <\/span>to a PRRO for 2005 – it should <\/span>bring more rigour to strategic planning and pr<\/span>ovide a longer timeframe. Relief and recovery <\/span>strategies should now be<\/span> developed, starting with locally de<\/span>termined strategies and targets <\/span>based on realistic assessments of how best to <\/span>meet local food needs and strengthen livelihoods. <\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Executive Summary The operation is characterised by its long duration and scale. 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